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ABSTRACT 
Eastern states, though they have enjoyed a history of relatively 
abundant water, increasingly face the need to conserve water, 
particularly to protect water-dependent ecosystems. At the same 
time, growing water demands, climate change, and an emerging 
water-oriented economy have intensified pressure for interstate 
water transfers. Thus, even traditionally wet states are seeking to 
protect or secure their water supplies. However, restrictions on 
water sales and exports risk running afoul of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. This Article offers guidance for states, 
particularly eastern states concerned with maintaining and 
improving water-dependent ecosystems, in seeking to restrict water 
exports while staying within the confines of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Water is the stuff of conflict. Essential to both life and 
commerce, but too often insufficient for all to have their fill, water 
makes enemies of landowners, irrigators, energy developers, 
environmentalists, ecosystems, industries, individuals, companies, 
flora, and fauna. So often, water places neighbors at odds.1  
Such struggles over water have played a defining role in the 
story of the western United States, and increasingly the wave of 
conflict washes east as newfound scarcity breeds concern and 
conflict. Recently, water disputes have arisen between North 
Carolina and South Carolina,2 between Mississippi and Tennessee,3 
as well as among Georgia, Alabama, and Florida.4 Moreover, 
droughts in the southern and southeastern United States have forced 
Texas to endure the driest seven-month span on record5 and have led 
football stadiums in Georgia to limit fans’ freedom to flush during 
major sporting events.6  
                                                                                                         
 1. As often quoted in water law articles, “[W]hiskey is for drinking and 
water is for fighting over.” See, e.g., Mark Davis & James Wilkins, A Defining 
Resource: Louisiana’s Place in the Emerging Water Economy, 57 LOY. L. REV. 
273, 285 (2011). 
 2. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 858 (2010). 
 3. Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 627 (5th 
Cir. 2009). 
 4. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1355 (M.D. 
Fla. 2009). 
 5. See, e.g., Betsy Blaney, Texas Drought 2011: State Endures Driest 7-Month 
Span on Record, HUFFPOST GREEN (May 9, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2011/05/10/texas-drought-2011-record_n_859902.html.  
 6. See Drinking Water Basics, NAT’L ACADS. WATER INFO. CTR., http:// 
water.nationalacademies.org/basics.shtml (last visited July 31, 2012) (“In 
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As water concerns grow in the national consciousness, a new 
challenge continues to place neighbors (this time states) in a 
difficult position regarding competing interests in water. This 
challenge is interstate water markets and their demand to export 
water from states where it is relatively abundant to drier environs. 
Concerned about climate change, drought, environmental 
conservation and enhancement, new in-state water needs, and a 
growing awareness that one state’s water may be very much 
coveted by its neighbors,7 states are seeking to find ways to hold 
on to their water, maintain and improve ecosystems, and turn water 
into a strategic asset.  
Louisiana and Texas offer a current example of this neighborly 
challenge. Louisiana, positioned at the terminus of major rivers 
and built by the alluvial action of those rivers, is a relatively water-
rich state. In fact, water concerns in Louisiana are more frequently 
perceived as stemming from overabundance (i.e., flooding) rather 
than from shortage.8 However, Louisiana is increasingly 
experiencing droughts and requires a copious outpouring of 
freshwater to maintain, much less restore, its vanishing coastline.9 
Texas, on the other hand, is not known for its abundant freshwater 
and has long recognized that its water resources are not sufficient 
to support its water use.10 In fact, Texas began eyeing Louisiana’s 
                                                                                                         
 
Athens, Georgia, fans at the University of Georgia’s homecoming football game 
were asked not to flush the toilets: stadium attendants were even hired to 
moderate flushing in a desperate effort to save water.”). 
 7. Support for this statement is too extensive to document here. However, by 
way of example, see Amy Joi O’Donoghue, The Fight for Water: Can the Mighty 
Mississippi Save the West?, DESERET NEWS (May 13, 2012, 6:21 P.M.), http:// 
www.deseretnews.com/article/865555735/The-fight-for-water-Can-the-mighty-
Mississippi-save-the-West.html?pg=all.  
 8. See Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance 
Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 63 (1985) (observing that “[n]o 
state in America is more familiar with flood losses than Louisiana, which sits on 
the Gulf of Mexico at the receiving end of waters draining the entire Central 
United States” and that “development of New Orleans and much of South 
Louisiana is a study in the very defiance of water”). 
 9. See COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., LOUISIANA’S 
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST (2012), available at 
http://www.lacpra.org/assets/docs/2012%20Master%20Plan/Final%20Plan/2012
%20Coastal%20Master%20Plan.pdf [hereinafter 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL 
MASTER PLAN], for a detailed examination highly reliant on river flows. 
 10. See Joe Patranella, Note, Love Thy Neighbor as Thyself: An Analysis of 
the Texas Water Shortage, Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, and 
Why Oklahoma Should Be Mandated to Allow Texas to Purchase Water, 52 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 297, 298 (2010) (explaining that “Texas is at an alarming 
crossroads in regard to its water supply” and that “[o]ne can hardly drive down 
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Mississippi River water as long ago as 1968.11 This water disparity 
between neighbors came to a head during the crippling record 
drought that in 2011 left Texas desperate for water.12 During that 
time, a private water-marketing company based in Texas proposed 
to buy up to 600,000 acre-feet of water per year from Louisiana’s 
Sabine River Authority.13 The idea of sending this water out of 
state found broad opposition in Louisiana, a state dependent on 
abundant water for everything from navigation to coastal 
restoration.14 So the question arose: What can be done to restrict 
such an export? 
Such a question about what a state might do to ensure that its 
waters do not become merely a well for wealthy neighbors is not 
unique to Louisiana. In fact, states have attempted to protect their 
water supplies from export for years.15 Given the rise of the new 
“water economy,”16 states’ escalating desires to take tighter hold of 
their water resources is perfectly reasonable.17 Further, it seems in 
keeping with our nation’s long tradition of leaving the nature and 
definition of water rights to the states.18  
                                                                                                         
 
the ever-crowded lanes of Interstate 35 without noticing a smattering of 
billboards encouraging, if not begging, the citizens of the Metroplex to curtail 
their water usage”). 
 11. See TEX. WATER DEV. BD., CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1968), available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/State_Water_Plan/ 
1968/1968%20Plan5.pdf. 
 12. See SUSAN COMBS, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, THE IMPACT 
OF THE 2011 DROUGHT AND BEYOND (2011), available at http://www.window. 
state.tx.us/specialrpt/drought/pdf/96-1704-Drought.pdf (stating that 2011 was “the 
driest year Texas has seen since modern recordkeeping began in 1895”). 
 13. See Tom Aswell, Jindal in Need of Deniability in Toledo Bend Water 
Sale Issue; À La John Kerry, He Was for the Sale Before He Was Against It, LA. 
VOICE (Feb. 1, 2012), http://louisianavoice.com/2012/02/01/jindal-in-need-of-
deniability-in-toledo-bend-water-sale-issue-a-la-john-kerry-he-was-for-the-sale-
before-he-was-against-it/. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See, e.g., Robert F. Durant & Michelle Deany Holmes, Thou Shalt Not 
Covet Thy Neighbor’s Water: The Rio Grande Basin Regulatory Experience, 45 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 821, 821–22 (1985) (analyzing “New Mexico’s experience as 
it sought first to deny and later to place severe limits on the export of 
groundwater to the city of El Paso, Texas”). 
 16. See, e.g., Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1. 
 17. See Durant & Holmes, supra note 15, at 821 (explaining that, in light of 
a burgeoning water demand across the country, as well as water-deficient states 
increasingly coveting the supplies of their neighbors, “those states that are 
vulnerable seek to impose or preserve statutory barriers to water export”). 
 18. See Stephen F. Williams, Free Trade in Water Resources: Sporhase v. 
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 2 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 89, 92 (1983) (stating that 
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It was just such an inclination that led Nebraska to limit the 
export of its groundwater. But when the United States Supreme 
Court struck down part of that restriction on Dormant Commerce 
Clause grounds in Sporhase v. Nebraska in 1982,19 a new chapter 
in American water law began. Since Sporhase, questions have 
lingered about the balance between state authority over water 
resources and the limits of the Dormant Commerce Clause.20  
Now, mounting pressure for water exports has increasingly 
placed the issue on state water-planning agendas and before the 
courts.21 However, much has changed in America’s water-scape 
since Sporhase, and water stewardship has become an urgent issue 
not only in dry western states, but also in traditionally wet eastern 
states. The prospects of rising seas and climate change are 
increasing the importance of states’ abilities to protect the water 
supplies necessary to secure their futures.22 Moreover, rolled into 
these concerns are the challenges presented by water-based 
ecosystems in the traditionally wetter eastern states. With efforts 
not only to conserve and maintain but also to enhance and 
replenish water-dependent wetlands, estuaries, and coastlines, a 
state’s ability to control its water resources becomes all the more 
important.23 
                                                                                                         
 
exemptions for resources subject to fictional state ownership arose in 1896 and, 
soon afterward, the Court applied the doctrine to water). 
 19. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
 20. See generally Williams, supra note 18, at 93–94 (contending that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sporhase failed to define a judicial test for 
scrutinizing water-export barriers and introduced ambiguous terms to guide the 
court’s future analyses). 
 21. The Supreme Court may even be in a position to reconsider the issue. 
See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011), 
petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3453 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2012). 
 22. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The 
Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 
781, 785–86 (2010) (discussing climate change impacts on water resources); A. 
Dan Tarlock, How California Local Governments Became Both Water Suppliers 
and Planners, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 10 (2010) (“A cascade of 
climate change studies continue to predict that arid and semiarid areas such as 
the American West face the risk of permanently decreased water budgets as 
precipitation declines and temperatures increase.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 273 (explaining that water 
in Louisiana “will be a scarce resource that will demand a well-thought-out and 
integrated approach to its stewardship” balancing “navigation, flood control, 
environmental, agricultural, industrial, and drinking water supplies,” and, “[a]s 
if things are not complicated enough, regional and interstate water needs are also 
growing, as are energy-driven water uses”). 
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Neither case law nor scholarly analysis has addressed the 
impact of Sporhase in eastern states or its particular impact on 
environmental conservation and restoration served by keeping 
water in place. Further, the cases that have followed Sporhase 
fundamentally misapply it, distorting the state–federal balance.24 In 
response, this Article offers guidance for states, particularly eastern 
states concerned with maintaining and improving water-dependent 
ecosystems, in seeking to restrict water exports while staying 
within the confines of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
Accordingly, in Part II, we begin by documenting some of the 
environmental concerns that may particularly impact the wetter 
eastern states and animate state efforts to limit the export of water. 
Then, in Part III, we revisit Sporhase and the line of cases leading 
up to it to provide a proper background and understanding of the 
balance between states’ powers to regulate water and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’s limitations. Following that, in Part IV, we 
highlight the important considerations that Sporhase and its 
surrounding cases leave for states to contemplate in shaping their 
water restrictions, and drawing on the example of Louisiana, we 
offer guidance for how eastern states might navigate the Sporhase 
Doctrine to protect environmental water uses. 
II. WET STATES AND WATER NEEDS 
The logic is so simple as to be obvious: water-based 
environments require water to survive. Thus, unsurprisingly, 
“[w]hen rivers and streams are deprived of adequate supplies of 
flowing water, the effects on wildlife are often devastating.”25 In 
fact, the effects are devastating on the entire ecosystem, as entire 
coastal estuaries, which are vital breeding grounds for plant and 
animal species, suffer with insufficient freshwater flows.26 There is 
no substitute for water flowing in its natural place. 
The western United States offers numerous examples of the 
struggles to maintain water supplies for ecosystems and the 
environmental harms resulting from inadequate water. Sufficient 
water flowing instream is essential for the trout and salmon 
populations of the Northwest, which would suffer greatly without 
state efforts to ensure these water supplies.27 Similarly, in the 
                                                                                                         
 24. See infra notes 127–156 and accompanying text. 
 25. Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private 
Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 203, 203 (1997). 
 26. See, e.g., Why Restore Estuaries?, RESTORE AMERICA’S ESTUARIES, 
http://www.estuaries.org/why-restore-estuaries/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2012). 
 27. Sterne, supra note 25, at 204. 
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Southwest, the riparian and wetland habitats, home to myriad plant 
and animal species that once flourished in the Colorado River 
Delta, were dependent on sufficient water flowing from the 
Colorado River into the Sea of Cortez.28 Without the water flows, 
those habitats and species are dwindling, if not gone altogether.29 
Obviously, eastern ecosystems require water as well, but 
because the wetter eastern states have historically not faced the 
water-supply challenges of the West, there has been less difficulty 
in maintaining sufficient water to sustain the environment. 
However, this does not diminish the need for water in place to 
maintain these environments. Abundant flowing freshwater 
supplies are crucial to ecosystems throughout the eastern United 
States, including the Everglades30 and the Chesapeake Bay.31 In 
fact, because these eastern ecosystems have evolved around a 
greater abundance of water, they frequently require a greater 
quantity of water than do those in the West. For example, 
enormous flows of sediment-laden freshwater32 are essential to the 
continued existence and productivity33 of Louisiana’s coast, which 
has experienced a crisis of land loss since at least the 1930s.34 This 
environment requires abundant freshwater just to maintain the 
current, depleted coastline.  
Moreover, these freshwater supplies are necessary for mere 
maintenance of the status quo, but environmental restoration and 
                                                                                                         
 28. See Sean T. Olson, Saving a Dying Oasis: Utilizing the United Nations 
Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses to 
Preserve and Restore the Colorado River Delta, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 
159, 159–60 (2005). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Learn About Your Watershed: Everglades 
Watershed, FLORIDA’S WATER, http://www.protectingourwater.org/watersheds/ 
map/everglades/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). 
 31. “Within the Chesapeake Bay watershed, five major rivers—the 
Susquehanna, Potomac, Rappahannock, York and James—provide almost 90 
percent of the fresh water to the Bay.” Rivers and Streams, CHESAPEAKE BAY 
PROGRAM, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/issues/issue/rivers_and_streams (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2012).  
 32. LA. GROUND WATER RES. COMM’N, MANAGING LOUISIANA’S 
GROUNDWATER RESOURCES 9 (2012), available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/ 
docs/conservation/groundwater/12.Final.GW.Report.pdf (“A reliable supply of 
fresh water is critically important to the long-term success of the [Louisiana 
Master Plan for Coastal Restoration and Protection].”). 
 33. See 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 9, at 20 
(noting that a healthy Louisiana coast provides, among other benefits, 26% of 
continental U.S. commercial fisheries production and habitat for 5 million 
migratory waterfowl).  
 34. Id. at 14; Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, 
Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3, 9–10 (1983). 
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enhancement will require even greater freshwater supplies. For 
example, restoration efforts in Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master 
Plan are premised on increased freshwater uses.35 Across the coast 
of Louisiana, the plan’s restoration agendas call for projects that 
“[m]aintain and increase, where possible, the input of freshwater to 
maintain a balance among saline and fresh wetlands,” “increas[e] 
the use of Atchafalaya River sediment and water . . . to sustain the 
coastal ecosystem,” and “[u]se sediment and water from the 
Mississippi River to sustain and rebuild land.”36 Additionally, the 
plan further focuses on freshwater, calling for “restor[ing] natural 
hydrologic patterns by conveying fresh water to areas that have 
been cut off by man-made features or by preventing the intrusion 
of salt water into fresh areas through man-made channels and 
eroded wetlands,” as well as diverting sediment using freshwater.37 
These plans are built on assumptions about environmental 
scenarios that include river discharge of between 509,000 and 
534,000 cubic feet per second.38 As this makes clear, Louisiana’s 
coast needs a lot of freshwater, sometimes in large doses, to 
maintain itself, much less rebuild.  
Beyond Louisiana, there is a national demand for freshwater to 
support restoration, enhancement, and even creation of wetland 
ecosystems. In fact, as a condition for any Clean Water Act 
Section 404(b) permit for dredging or filling a wetland, the EPA 
and Army Corps require compensatory mitigation for losses of 
aquatic resources, which includes “restoration, enhancement, 
establishment, and in certain circumstances preservation” of 
aquatic resource functions.39 Such projects, which may involve 
greater than one-to-one acreage compensation,40 will likely require 
freshwater supplies greater than those currently allocated to 
environmental uses, and water in place will be essential to meeting 
these demands.  
Sufficient freshwater flow is essential for maintaining aquatic 
environments, and having a reliable water source in place is 
necessary for improving and restoring them. To ensure that such 
water is available and in place, “wet” states, which are likely to be 
                                                                                                         
 35. See 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 9, at 46. 
 36. Id. at 31, 118, 124, 130.  
 37. Id. at 68–69. 
 38. Id. at 83. To give these flow numbers some context, the average annual 
flow of the Colorado River measured at Lees Ferry is 15 million acre-feet per 
year or 20,719 cubic feet per second. See U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, INTERIM REPORT NO. 1: COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY (STATUS REPORT) 18 (2011). 
 39. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.93 (2011). 
 40. See id.  
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targeted as sources for interstate water markets, may wish to limit 
water exports. 
III. A HISTORY OF STATE WATER REGULATION AND THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
While state police power provides a basis for regulating the use 
and export of water, the Dormant Commerce Clause limits state 
power in this area. Thus, to successfully protect water in place, 
states must navigate the Sporhase Doctrine to create water 
restrictions that do not run afoul of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. This Part offers the background context for understanding 
the Sporhase Doctrine. First, it gives a broad overview of state 
water regulations. Next, it turns to an outline of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause in general. Finally, it considers the line of cases 
where these two intersect, culminating in the leading case on the 
issue, Sporhase.  
A. State Water Regulation 
Water has historically been a natural resource controlled by the 
states as part of their police power, and the regulation, allocation, 
and administration of water resources has, with little exception, 
been an aspect of state law.41 Thus, there are 50 different sets of 
water laws in the United States.42 Each state has developed its own 
water-law regimes for surface water and groundwater (which are 
often treated separately),43 and states’ treatment of water ranges 
from a fully-held private property interest to a mere usufruct right. 
Though each state employs its own distinct water provisions, 
multiple states certainly embrace common doctrines.44 While most 
                                                                                                         
 41. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 315 (3d ed. 1997) 
(“The federal government has long deferred to state law in the allocation of 
water, even on public lands.”). 
 42. See, e.g., R. Timothy Weston, Harmonizing Management of Ground 
and Surface Water Use Under Eastern Water Law Regimes, 11 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV. 239, 246 (2008) (discussing the eastern states’ embrace of the 
riparian rights doctrine but remarking that “[t]he details of riparian doctrine vary 
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; while the jurisdictions share many 
fundamental principles, subtle but important nuances exist within the laws of the 
eastern states” (citation omitted)). 
 43. For further discussion of the law of groundwater and diffused surface 
water, see GETCHES, supra note 41, at 8–11. 
 44. For example, “[t]he eight most arid states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) constitutionally or 
statutorily repudiated riparian rights very early and adopted prior appropriation 
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states have replaced the pure common law doctrines with 
“statutory,” “regulated,” or “permit-based” variations,45 the 
traditional structures described below remain descriptive enough to 
offer a broad overview.  
In the case of surface water, western states generally favor the 
prior appropriation doctrine; whereas, eastern states generally take 
a riparian approach.46 The prior appropriation states of the West 
traditionally recognize water rights only when water is diverted 
from its natural course and put to beneficial use, so severing water 
from its watercourse is essential to the right.47 The other key 
attribute of prior-appropriation schemes is the “first-in-time, first-
in-right” approach to shortage, whereby an earlier (“senior”) water 
user has right to his entire appropriation before a more recent 
(“junior”) appropriator has any right to water.48  
Eastern riparian regimes, on the other hand, focus on 
maintaining water in watercourses and sharing in times of 
shortage. Riparian water rights stem not from diversion, but rather 
from ownership of a tract of land that abuts or contains a 
                                                                                                         
 
as the sole method of acquiring rights to the use of water for all beneficial 
purposes.” Id. at 81. 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 5 (observing that “[r]iparian rules have been altered by 
statute and case law so that today there are no riparian doctrine states governed 
simply by common law” and that, “[t]ypically, riparians must obtain permits 
from a state agency in order to use water”). 
 46. See id. at 21–22 (explaining that as the United States expanded, the 
preexisting “riparian doctrine was thought to be impractical for the arid region 
beyond the one-hundredth meridian” because it was “[a] system that limited 
rights to owners of land bordering a stream,” leading to the West’s embrace of 
the prior appropriation doctrine to allow settlers to “make a diversion that did 
not deprive ‘prior appropriators’ of the quantity of water already being diverted 
by them”). 
 47. Id. While some jurisdictions require the physical diversion of water 
from a stream, others do not require actual removal of the water as long as there 
is some use of it, including instream use. Id. at 92–93. See also, e.g., Bountiful 
City v. De Luca, 292 P. 194 (Utah 1930) (requiring a diversion of water even for 
use as a water supply for livestock). But see In re Dearborn Drainage Area, 766 
P.2d 228, 233 (Mont. 1988) (“A completed appropriation meant an actual 
diversion of the water which served any of several purposes. Diversion proved 
an intent to appropriate the water, as did the capacity of the works.” (citations 
omitted)), overruled by In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of 
All of the Water, 55 P.3d 396 (Mont. 2002) (holding that a diversion is not 
required when water can be used beneficially without a diversion). 
 48. Id. at 101 (“When there is not enough water for both senior and junior 
appropriators, the doctrine of priority allows the full senior right to be exercised 
before the junior can use any water.”). 
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watercourse (i.e., a riparian tract).49 A riparian landowner 
traditionally has the right to make reasonable use of water on the 
riparian tract or within a prescribed distance from the watercourse 
so that return flows will ensure sufficient water for downstream 
users.50 In times of drought, all riparians share the burden of 
shortage; earlier users receive no favored status.51  
States also vary in their legal treatment of groundwater, which 
is usually managed and regulated differently than surface water 
despite being chemically fungible (as well as, in some cases, 
hydrologically connected). This disparity is undoubtedly rooted in 
the physical obviousness of surface water and the hidden nature of 
groundwater aquifers that, until the 1930s, were beyond our 
technical capacity to tap to any great degree.52 Over the past 
hundred years, great advances have been made in our 
understanding of hydrology and our ability to access, transport, 
and treat water to make it usable, but for the most part the laws 
governing groundwater continue to treat it as a resource legally 
distinct from surface water. Groundwater management schemes 
fall into five predominant regimes that are often statutorily 
modified within states.53 However, unlike surface-water laws, state 
groundwater doctrines do not fall into as predictable of a pattern in 
the eastern as in the western United States; in fact, individual states 
may contain multiple groundwater management districts with 
differing regulations.54  
States also vary in the legal status they give to water rights. In 
some states, water rights are merely usufruct interests; in other 
states they are closer to private property. For example, in 
Louisiana, running waters and naturally navigable waters are 
“public things” owned by the State in its capacity as a public 
                                                                                                         
 49. Id. at 59 (“Because parties generally intend to transfer water rights 
along with the land, the courts have held that a conveyance of riparian land 
carries with it all of the riparian rights appurtenant to that land even if not 
expressly conveyed by the deed.”). 
 50. Id. at 48–49 (“A riparian proprietor is subject to liability for making an 
unreasonable use of the water of a watercourse or lake that causes harm to 
another riparian proprietor’s reasonable use of the water or his land.”). 
 51. See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 475 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) 
(explaining that all riparian proprietors have equal right to use the balance of 
water flowing in a shared waterway). 
 52. See, e.g., Michael Pappas, Unnatural Resource Law: Situating 
Desalination in Coastal Resource and Water Law Doctrines, 86 TUL. L. REV. 
81, 97 (2011). 
 53. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 345 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 54. Id. 
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person;55 all water rights are merely usufruct.56 A number of other 
state laws also contain declarations that surface water is publicly 
owned and that water rights permit only certain uses.57 On the 
other hand, in some jurisdictions “a water right is a legally 
recognized and freely alienable property right.”58  
These differences in the property status of water rights can 
exist not only between states, but also within the same state. For 
example, some states, like Texas and Louisiana, recognize greater 
private property rights in groundwater than in surface water.59 
Again, this stems from groundwater’s long treatment as something 
completely apart from surface water and so difficult to understand 
as to put it beyond public control and oversight.60  
All of this variation underscores that treatment, characterization, 
and management of water resources are functions of state law. 
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
Far from being a creature of state law, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause is thoroughly federal in nature. It grows out of the 
Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution, which gives 
the federal government the power to regulate interstate 
                                                                                                         
 55. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1107 (2011). The high seas are a common 
thing under article 449 and are not owned, in the property sense, by anyone. LA. 
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 449 (2010). 
 56. See GETCHES, supra note 41, at 213 (explaining that Louisiana has 
various statutorily created types of water districts that supply customers with 
use, but not ownership, of water). 
 57. See id. at 304 (noting that “a few states attempt to regulate or restrict a 
landowner’s use of diffused surface water”). 
 58. See Robert E. Beck & Owen L. Anderson, Reallocations, Transfers, and 
Changes, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 14.01(b)(1) (Robert E. Beck & 
Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
 59. See, e.g., Texas Water Law, TEX. A&M UNIV., http://texaswater. 
tamu.edu/water-law (last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (discussing the difference in 
Texas surface versus groundwater law).  
 60. This view is at the heart of the “rule of capture” approach to 
groundwater use and management, which is the law in Texas and is effectively 
the law in Louisiana. In justifying this “it’s yours if you take it” approach, the 
Texas Supreme Court has noted that groundwater is “so secret, occult, and 
concealed that an attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to [it] 
would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would, therefore, be practically 
impossible.” See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., 1 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. 
1999) (citation omitted). Most states have gravitated away from this capture 
rule, but recently Texas not only affirmed the rule, but went further to hold that 
restrictions on future withdrawals by owners of overlying parcels may give rise 
to compensable takings claims against the state. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. 
Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 838 (Tex. 2012). 
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commerce.61 The “flip side” of this grant of power to the federal 
government is the Dormant (or Negative) Commerce Clause, a 
doctrine built on the reasoning that if the federal government has 
the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce, then states 
necessarily cannot legislate to interfere with interstate commerce.62 
The fundamental inquiry in Dormant Commerce Clause cases, 
then, is whether states are interfering with interstate commerce, 
and the challenge courts face is distinguishing between 
impermissible interference and economic protectionism, on the one 
hand, and permissible exercise of state police power to regulate 
health and safety, on the other.63  
In making these determinations in the water context, the court 
first distinguishes between “evenhanded” regulations and “explicit 
barriers to commerce.”64 If a restriction “regulates evenhandedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental,” the court will apply the 
balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church and will uphold the 
restriction “unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”65 
However, if a regulation facially or intentionally discriminates 
against commerce, it is an “explicit barrier to commerce” subject 
to strict scrutiny; for such a measure to survive, the state must 
demonstrate that it is narrowly tailored to a legitimate local 
purpose.66  
C. Striking the Balance: Sporhase in Context 
Since the founding of the Union, state water regulations and 
the Dormant Commerce Clause have found themselves at odds in 
only a handful of cases.67 Though countless legal disputes have 
arisen over water as a highway for commerce (leading to tomes of 
jurisprudence and commentary relating to navigation and 
                                                                                                         
 61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”). 
 62. See Christine A. Klein, The Dormant Commerce Clause and Water 
Export: Toward a New Analytical Program, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 134 
(2011). 
 63. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982). 
 64. See id. at 954–58. 
 65. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 66. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957. 
 67. See, e.g., WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 58 (2d ed. 1988) (“Until 1982, 
the U.S. Supreme Court had not considered the constitutionality of antiexportation 
statutes in light of the so-called ‘negative Commerce Clause’ . . . .”). 
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navigability),68 rarely has interstate controversy arisen over water 
as an article of commerce itself.69 That, however, is changing 
rapidly. As noted above, with increasing water demands, 
overexploited water resources, and climate change destabilizing 
water supplies, interstate water markets are on the rise.70 These 
markets increase demand and pressure for the export of water from 
one state to another, building the tension between state powers to 
regulate waters and federal limits on these powers. As these 
concerns amplify and creep east, as “dry” states eye their “wet” 
neighbors, and as the options for preserving and restoring water-
based ecosystems decrease, this area of law needs to come into 
much sharper focus. This process begins with properly 
understanding the handful of cases on the subject: the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Hudson County, Altus, and Sporhase, and the 
subsequent lower court cases El Paso I, El Paso II, and Tarrant.  
In 1908, the Supreme Court first addressed the balance 
between state water restrictions and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,71 holding that 
New Jersey’s characterization of water as a state-owned resource 
insulated its water-use restrictions from Dormant Commerce 
Clause review.72 As a result, the Court concluded that New 
Jersey’s “ownership” of its water resources was sufficient to justify 
its prohibition on interstate transfer of surface water.73 
The New Jersey statute at issue in Hudson County sought to 
conserve freshwater “for the health and prosperity of [its] citizens” 
by making it illegal for any person or corporation to transport New 
Jersey surface water for use in any other state.74 A water company, 
which, despite that statute, had contracted to provide water from a 
                                                                                                         
 68. See id. at 73–74 (explaining that the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided in 1865 that commerce includes transportation, “which in turn includes 
‘navigation,’ and that the power to regulate navigation includes the control of 
navigable waters,” and the Court provided for a broad interpretation of the 
navigation power). 
 69. There certainly have been numerous disputes between states over claims 
to certain water sources, such as the Colorado River or the Great Lakes, but 
these disputes have focused on the right to withdraw or the allocation of water 
rather than water as an article of commerce. See generally Robert W. Adler, 
Revisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time for a Change?, 28 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19 (2008). 
 70. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 71. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). 
 72. Id. at 356–57. 
 73. Id. at 354. 
 74. Id. at 353 (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to 
transport or carry, through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals, the waters of any 
fresh water lake, pond, brook, creek, river, or stream of this state into any other 
state, for use therein.”). 
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New Jersey River for use in New York City, then challenged the 
statute, asserting that it violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.75 
In evaluating the challenge, the Court emphasized that New 
Jersey, as part of its police power, had the power to define property 
rights and, consequently, had the power to reserve certain 
resources in the public rather than private or commercial spheres.76 
The Court explained that “the state, as quasi-sovereign and 
representative of the interests of the public” has the power to 
protect its natural resources and define the limits of property 
interests that may be held in those resources.77 Moreover, the Court 
particularly stressed the extent of state power to define the property 
interests available in water resources, noting:  
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and 
independent of particular theory than the interest of the 
public of a state to maintain the rivers that are wholly 
within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts 
upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit 
for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.78  
The Court further reasoned that New Jersey had exercised its 
police power authority to keep its water resources outside of 
commerce and to maintain a “residuum of public ownership” in all 
waters.79 So, while New Jersey law permitted riparian usage of 
water, allowing riparian proprietors to divert limited amounts of 
water within prescribed distances and for certain ordinary uses,80 
                                                                                                         
 75. The water company brought a host of other claims as well. Id. at 353–54 
(“The defendant sets up that the statute, if applicable to it, is contrary to the 
Constitution of the United States, that it impairs the obligation of contracts, 
takes property without due process of law, interferes with commerce between 
New Jersey and New York, denies the privileges of citizens of New Jersey to 
citizens of other States, and denies to them the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 76. See id. at 355 (“The limits set to property by other public interests 
present themselves as a branch of what is called the police power of the State.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 355–56.  
 79. Id. at 354–55. The statute and controversy at issue in this case dealt only 
with surface water, and the Court specifically addressed “rivers” in much of its 
reasoning. However, periodically, the Court shifted its language from “surface 
water” or “rivers” to “water.” See id. at 355 (“[T]he state, as quasi-sovereign and 
representative of the interests of the public, has a standing in court to protect the 
atmosphere, the water, and the forests within its territory . . . .”). This does not 
change the narrow subject of the case from just surface water, and the failure to 
differentiate may be because the opinion predated the boom of groundwater 
usage beginning in the 1930s. 
 80. Id. (“The private right to appropriate is subject . . . to the initial 
limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of 
public welfare and health.”). 
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these riparian rights did not include grants of title in the corpus of 
the water.81 The Court stressed that New Jersey riparian proprietors 
did not own the body of the stream, which remained property of 
the state; rather the riparian merely had the right “to have the flow 
continue.”82 In reaching its conclusion, the Court focused its 
inquiry on the extent of state police power and the announced New 
Jersey law; it did not make a practical inquiry into how New Jersey 
water was treated de facto (i.e., whether water was actually 
transferred commercially or for payment in New Jersey). In sum, 
the Court held that water in New Jersey was publicly owned and 
managed by the state, and while riparians had some right to use the 
water, the water itself was not, and under New Jersey law could 
not be,83 privately owned or commoditized.84  
Hudson County stood as the sole Supreme Court precedent 
regarding Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to a water 
restriction until 1966,85 when the Court summarily affirmed that a 
Texas water regulation violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.86 
This case, City of Altus v. Carr, involved a suit by an Oklahoma 
city challenging, as a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
a Texas law forbidding the interstate export of groundwater 
without approval by the Texas legislature.87 The suit proceeded 
before a three-judge district court panel,88 which struck down the 
statute.89 In reaching this conclusion, the district court held that 
groundwater was an article of commerce under Texas law, which 
allowed for private ownership and sale of groundwater once it was 
pumped from the ground.90 The district court based this ruling on a 
specific examination of Texas water law, ultimately concluding 
that “[t]here is no question of state ownership of captured 
                                                                                                         
 81. Id. at 354–55 (“[A]s against the rights of riparian owners merely as 
such, the state was warranted in prohibiting the acquisition of the title to water 
on a larger scale.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 357 (“A man cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use 
it in commerce among the states. Neither can he enlarge his otherwise limited 
and qualified right to the same end.”). 
 84. Id. at 354–56. 
 85. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 947 (1982). 
 86. See City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 385 
U.S. 35 (1966). 
 87. Id. at 830. 
 88. This was pursuant to the now-repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2281, which provided 
that “an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, 
operation or execution of a State statute on grounds of unconstitutionality should 
not be granted unless the application has been heard and determined by a three-
judge district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976). 
 89. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 830–31. 
 90. Id. at 839.  
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underground water, for the law of Texas91 is well settled that the 
landowner has the right to drill wells and appropriate the water 
beneath his land.”92 Accordingly, the court held that the statute, 
which restricted only interstate export and not in-state transfer of 
Texas groundwater, was an undue burden on interstate 
commerce.93  
Texas appealed the ruling directly to the Supreme Court,94 
which summarily affirmed the result without necessarily 
embracing the reasoning of the court below and without supplying 
its own discussion or reasoning.95 Thus, after Altus, which turned 
on the intricacies of Texas’s particular groundwater regime,96 
Hudson County remained the Court’s sole written opinion on the 
intersection of state water regulation and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.  
It was against this background that in 1982 the Court 
considered Sporhase and invalidated part of a Nebraska water 
statute for inconsistency with the Dormant Commerce Clause.97 
The statute at issue required a permit for the withdrawal of 
Nebraska groundwater that was to be transported for use in another 
state.98 To qualify for such a permit, the withdrawal had to meet 
four conditions.99 The first three conditions required that the 
withdrawal must be reasonable, not contrary to the conservation 
and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimental to the 
public welfare.100 Finally, the fourth condition was a reciprocity 
requirement, demanding that “the state in which the water is to be 
used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground 
water from that state for use in the State of Nebraska.”101 A water 
                                                                                                         
 91. The Texas law on this matter is unique; Texas is the only state that has 
the absolute capture doctrine for groundwater. See Deborah Clarke Trejo, 
Identifying and Valuing Groundwater Withdrawal Rights in the Context of 
Takings Claims—A Texas Case Study, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 409, 413 (2010) 
(“Indeed, Texas is the only state in the country that has not fully abandoned the 
Rule of Capture.”). As previously noted, the Texas Supreme Court went even 
further in 2012, holding that the owner of an overlying tract had a compensable 
property interest in unpumped and uncaptured groundwater. See supra note 60. 
 92. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 833.  
 93. Id. at 839. 
 94. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006) (allowing for direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court from a district court of three judges). 
 95. Carr v. City of Altus, 385 U.S. 35 (1966). 
 96. Texas groundwater law is an abnormality in the United States because it 
follows a strict rule of capture. See supra note 91. 
 97. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982). 
 98. Id. at 941, 943–44. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 944.  
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user wishing to export Nebraska groundwater to Colorado 
challenged the statute as a violation of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.102 
In evaluating the case, the Court considered three issues: (1) 
whether the water was an article of commerce subject to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause; (2) whether Nebraska’s restrictions 
imposed an impermissible burden on commerce; and (3) whether 
Congress had granted to the states permission to regulate 
commerce in this area.103 First, as a threshold matter, the Court 
held that Nebraska’s groundwater was an article of commerce and, 
thus, subject to Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry.104 Second, it 
held that Nebraska’s first three restrictions were constitutionally 
valid but that the fourth condition, the reciprocity requirement, was 
an impermissible burden on commerce.105 Finally, the Court 
determined that Congress had not granted the states authority to 
regulate commerce in this area.106 
The Court first concluded that Nebraska’s groundwater was an 
article of commerce,107 which meant that it was subject to both 
federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction and Dormant Commerce 
Clause limitations.108 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
rejected Nebraska’s contention that, like the surface water at issue 
in Hudson County, its groundwater was state-owned and therefore 
outside of commerce.109 Rather, the Court characterized 
Nebraska’s state ownership argument as “a legal fiction” because 
utilities in Nebraska withdrew and distributed groundwater for 
municipal water supplies.110 Because the utilities charged a fee for 
providing this water, the Court concluded that groundwater was in 
fact commoditized in Nebraska.111 Dismissing Nebraska’s 
                                                                                                         
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 941, 943–44. 
 104. Id. at 953–54. 
 105. Id. at 955, 958. 
 106. Id. at 941, 943–44. 
 107. The opinion addressed only Nebraska groundwater and offered no 
comment on surface water. Id. at 953–54 (“But appellee’s claim that Nebraska 
ground water is not an article of commerce goes too far: it would not only 
exempt Nebraska ground water regulation from burden-on-commerce analysis, 
it would also curtail the affirmative power of Congress to implement its own 
policies concerning such regulation. If Congress chooses to legislate in this area 
under its commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska 
than in Texas and States with similar property laws.” (emphasis added) (citing 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621–23 (1978))).  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 950. 
 110. Id. at 952. 
 111. Id. 
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argument that these fees were paid merely for distribution and not 
for the water itself, the Court concluded that the characterization of 
the payment was unimportant; rather, the fact that the water was 
distributed in exchange for value made it an article of commerce 
regardless of the formalities of the rate structure.112 Thus, the Court 
grounded its conclusion in a functionalist assessment of how 
Nebraska treated water de facto, holding that Nebraska 
groundwater was an article of commerce despite the Nebraska 
Supreme Court’s ruling that “under Nebraska law, ground water is 
not ‘a market item freely transferable for value among private 
parties, and therefore [is] not an article of commerce.’”113 The 
Court also stressed hydrological factors that made the water at 
issue in Sporhase an article of interstate commerce, particularly 
emphasizing the interstate nature of the Ogallala Aquifer, which 
was the source of the water at issue.114  
Having held Nebraska’s groundwater to be an article of 
commerce, the Court next analyzed whether Nebraska’s 
regulations ran afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Court 
held that although the first three conditions were valid, the fourth 
was an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.115 In this 
analysis, the Court first considered whether Nebraska’s permit 
conditions were evenhanded regulations or explicit barriers to 
commerce, determining that the first three requirements—that the 
withdrawal must be reasonable, not contrary to the conservation 
and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimental to the 
public welfare—were evenhanded restrictions because Nebraska 
also imposed restrictions on intrastate water transfers. Thus, these 
conditions received and survived the Pike balancing test.116 
However, the Court found the fourth restriction—the reciprocity 
requirement—to be an explicit barrier to commerce and therefore 
subject to strict scrutiny review, which it ultimately failed because 
it was not narrowly tailored.117 Finally, the Court considered 
                                                                                                         
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 944. 
 114. Id. at 953. 
 115. Id. at 954–58. 
 116. Id. at 954–55. In Pike, the Court stated that “[w]here the statute 
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its 
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) 
(citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)). 
 117. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957. 
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whether Congress had permitted the states to regulate commerce in 
this area and determined that it had not.118  
As the first Supreme Court case to offer a written opinion 
invalidating a state water restriction on Dormant Commerce Clause 
grounds, Sporhase created a great amount of uncertainty.119 
Particularly, Sporhase led to questions about the continued validity 
of Hudson County,120 the validity of other states’ water restrictions, 
and even states’ power to continue regulating their water 
sources.121 The opinion led to a wave of questions and 
commentary;122 however, few cases have since arisen to flesh out 
the Sporhase Doctrine. In fact, the only cases directly applying 
Sporhase followed within a few years of that decision and were 
confined to a district court in New Mexico. 
The first of these cases, El Paso v. Reynolds (“El Paso I”), 
considered New Mexico’s prohibition on the out-of-state export of 
groundwater and ultimately held the provision unconstitutional.123 
Giving rise to the case, the City of El Paso, Texas, attempted to 
meet growing water demands by appropriating groundwater from 
New Mexico.124 However, a New Mexico statute banned the 
export of groundwater from New Mexico for use in another 
state,125 and on these grounds New Mexico denied El Paso an 
                                                                                                         
 118. Id. at 958–60. 
 119. See Arthur H. Chan, Policy Impacts of Sporhase v. Nebraska, 22 J. 
ECON. ISSUES 1153, 1153 (1988) (explaining that Sporhase marked the first time 
that the Court set forth a national policy governing interstate groundwater 
allocation when previously states largely regulated groundwater resources and 
claiming that the implications of the decision continued to require careful study). 
 120. See, e.g., Edward B. Schwartz, Water as an Article of Commerce: State 
Embargoes Spring a Leak Under Sporhase v. Nebraska, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 103, 117 (1985) (claiming that “[i]n Sporhase, the Court completed the 
reversal of Hudson County which it had begun in City of Altus”). 
 121. See generally Chan, supra note 119. 
 122. See Douglas L. Grant & Bret C. Birdsong, State Regulation of Interstate 
Water Export, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 48.03 (Robert E. Beck & 
Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
 123. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 380, 392 (D.N.M. 1983) 
[hereinafter El Paso I]. 
 124. Id. at 381. 
 125. Id. at 381 n.2 (“No person shall withdraw water from any underground 
source in New Mexico for use in any other state by drilling a well in New 
Mexico and transporting the water outside the state or by drilling a well outside 
the boundaries of New Mexico and pumping water from under lands lying 
within the boundaries of New Mexico; provided that nothing in this act prohibits 
the transportation of water by tank truck from an underground source in New 
Mexico to any other state where the water is used for exploration and drilling for 
oil or gas . . . . The amount of water withdrawn from any one well for such 
exportation shall never exceed three acre-feet.”). 
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appropriation permit.126 El Paso then challenged the New Mexico 
statute as a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.127 In 
evaluating the claim, the district court applied a broad reading of 
Sporhase to conclude that the water was categorically an article of 
commerce.128 Rather than inquire into the specifics of New 
Mexico’s water law, the district court read Sporhase as an 
expansive declaration that all water is an article of commerce and 
that all state ownership claims are legal fictions, regardless of the 
particularities of state law or practice.129 The district court then 
held New Mexico’s restrictions completely banning export to be 
explicit barriers to commerce subject to strict scrutiny.130 Again 
reading Sporhase broadly, the district court reasoned that “a state 
may discriminate in favor of its citizens only to the extent that 
water is essential to human survival. Outside of fulfilling human 
survival needs, water is an economic resource.”131 Thus, the 
district court found that the regulations were economic 
protectionism because “there is no present or imminent shortage of 
water in New Mexico for health and safety needs.”132 The court 
dismissed as irrelevant New Mexico’s predictions of future 
shortages for “‘public welfare’ needs, including water 
requirements for municipalities, industry, irrigated agriculture, 
energy production, fish and wildlife, and recreation.”133  
However, this decision did not end the water struggle between 
El Paso and New Mexico. In the wake of El Paso I, the New 
Mexico Legislature amended the restrictions at issue, but the state 
appealed the El Paso I decision to the Tenth Circuit.134 In light of 
the change of law, the Tenth Circuit vacated El Paso I and 
remanded the matter for the district court to reconsider El Paso’s 
renewed challenge to the amended restrictions.135 Thus, in El Paso 
II, the same district court considered a new set of water 
                                                                                                         
 126. Id. at 381. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 388. 
 129. Id. (stating that “water is an article of commerce” and “a state’s asserted 
ownership of public waters within the state is only a legal fiction” (internal 
citations omitted)). The district court reached this conclusion without examining 
New Mexico’s characterization of water, despite later in the opinion recognizing 
New Mexico as a “pioneer in ground water management” and as a state in 
which, by law, all groundwaters “are public waters.” Id. at 389. 
 130. Id. at 388. 
 131. Id. at 389 (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. at 390. 
 133. Id. 
 134. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D.N.M. 1984) 
[hereinafter El Paso II]. 
 135. Id. at 696–97. 
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restrictions, finding some valid and others unconstitutional in light 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause.136 
The new statutory scheme at issue in El Paso II imposed 
restrictions on some appropriations for in-state groundwater use, as 
well as appropriations for out-of-state groundwater use. Permit 
conditions for in-state groundwater use applied only to new 
appropriations from certain “declared” basins137 and required a 
finding that appropriation was “not contrary to conservation of 
water within the state” and “not detrimental to the public welfare 
of the state.”138 Permit conditions for out-of-state groundwater use 
applied more broadly, affecting “all interstate uses of ground 
water—new appropriations from declared and undeclared basins, 
new surface water appropriations, transfers of water rights, and 
supplemental and domestic wells.”139 These conditions required 
that out-of-state uses “would not impair existing water rights, [are] 
not contrary to the conservation of water within the state and [are] 
not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare of the citizens of 
New Mexico.”140 Further, the New Mexico law also required the 
state engineer to consider six additional factors in applications for 
water export.141 Finally, New Mexico regulations imposed a two-
year moratorium on new groundwater wells in the two basins that 
El Paso had targeted for appropriation.142 
In considering El Paso’s renewed challenge, the court upheld 
New Mexico’s more evenhanded restrictions. It ruled that 
requiring that exports not be “contrary to the conservation of water 
within the state” and “not otherwise detrimental to the public 
welfare of the citizens of New Mexico” could withstand a facial 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.143 Similarly, the court held 
that requiring the state engineer to consider the six factors did not 
violate the Commerce Clause when applied to “new appropriations 
of water to be used outside New Mexico.”144 Key to this holding 
was the court’s conclusion that these export restrictions were 
evenhanded because they mirrored the burdens on new 
                                                                                                         
 136. Id. at 708. 
 137. Id. at 703. 
 138. Id. at 697. 
 139. Id. at 703. 
 140. Id. at 697. 
 141. These included analyses of “the effect of the proposed export on in-state 
shortages,” “the applicant’s water supply and demand,” and “the alternate 
sources of water supply available to the applicant in the state of import.” Id. 
 142. Id. at 705–06. 
 143. Id. at 708. Other aspects of New Mexico’s approach to regulating water 
were, however, found to violate the Commerce Clause. Id. Those aspects are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
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appropriations for in-state water use.145 However, the court also 
struck down two portions of New Mexico’s amended water 
restrictions as undue burdens on commerce. First, the court held 
that restrictions applying only to export applications and not to in-
state transfers were facially discriminatory and not narrowly 
tailored.146 Second, the court invalidated New Mexico’s limited 
moratorium on new appropriations, finding that though it applied 
evenhandedly to both in-state and out-of-state appropriators, it 
served the discriminatory purpose of blocking El Paso’s attempts 
to access groundwater.147 Finally, the El Paso II court retreated 
from its previous hardline that only “human survival” could justify 
in-state water preference; rather, the court reasoned that “health 
and safety, recreational, aesthetic, environmental and economic 
interests” could be sufficient “public welfare” concerns to justify 
some in-state preference.148  
After El Paso I and II, no case directly confronted the Sporhase 
issue of whether water restrictions run afoul of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause until Tarrant Regional Water District v. 
Herrmann.149 The Tarrant case involved a Dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge to Oklahoma’s laws restricting water exports, 
with the additional wrinkle that some of those waters were covered 
by the multistate Red River Compact.150 The case arose when the 
Tarrant Regional Water District, a Texas state agency, sought to 
appropriate water in Oklahoma for use in Texas.151 In conjunction 
with its application for an appropriation permit, Tarrant sought 
declaratory judgment to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of 
Oklahoma statutes that limited export or out-of-state water use.152 
                                                                                                         
 145. Id. at 698. 
 146. Id. at 703–04, 708 (concluding that application of “the conservation and 
public welfare criteria and the six factors . . . to . . . domestic wells and transfers 
of existing rights where the water is to be used outside the State creates an 
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce” because these restrictions 
applied only to “applications to export water from domestic and transfer wells 
but not [to] in-state transfers and domestic wells”). 
 147. Id. at 706–07 (“The only factor that distinguishes the Hueco and Mesilla 
Bolsons which would explain their special treatment is that El Paso has filed 
applications for export from those aquifers.”). 
 148. Id. at 700. 
 149. 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 150. Id. at 1227. Multistate compacts are creatures of the Compact Clause of 
the United States Constitution and have the effect of federal law. See generally 
Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741 (2010). 
 151. Tarrant, 656 F.3d at 1227. 
 152. Id.  
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Relying on Sporhase, Tarrant claimed that these Oklahoma statutes 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.153  
However, both the district court and the Tenth Circuit ruled 
that Sporhase was distinguishable and that Dormant Commerce 
Clause limitations were inapplicable because the Red River waters 
at issue were subject to an interstate compact ratified by 
Congress.154 The district court and Tenth Circuit agreed that 
because the congressionally ratified Red River Compact divided 
the water between states and specifically allocated certain portions 
to Oklahoma, then Oklahoma’s restrictions pursuant to that 
allocation could not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause.155 
Thus, in a decision rendered in September 2011, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that “[t]he broad language of key Compact provisions 
inoculates the Oklahoma statutes challenged here from Dormant 
Commerce Clause attack” because the compact contained clear 
statements authorizing state regulation.156 Tarrant has sought 
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court on this issue, and 
the petition was still pending at the time of this writing.157  
IV. STATE PRACTICE IN LIGHT OF A CORRECT READING OF 
SPORHASE 
As interstate water markets come online, states need to 
carefully consider any restrictions on water export or preferences 
for in-state water use. Sporhase and its surrounding cases 
(collectively, the “Sporhase Doctrine”) leave states with four 
important considerations to assess the compatibility of state water 
regulations with the Dormant Commerce Clause. First, both state 
characterizations of water resources and state water practice will 
determine whether waters are articles of commerce and water 
regulations are subject to Dormant Commerce Clause review. 
Second, generally applicable water restrictions are more likely to 
survive Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Third, states gain 
more freedom to regulate when they define and document water 
“shortage.”158 Finally, water compacts can remove state water 
                                                                                                         
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 1231, 1239. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 1237. 
 157. See Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann Pending Petition, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/tarrant-regional-water-
district-v-herrmann/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2012). 
 158. As discussed later, the authors argue that the term shortage, as used by 
the Court, actually stands in for water need, as opposed to drought. See 
discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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restrictions from Dormant Commerce Clause review. 
Understanding the Sporhase Doctrine and properly accounting for 
these considerations is essential to states’ abilities to shape their 
water futures, particularly when it comes to environmental water 
concerns. This Part discusses each consideration in turn and uses 
Louisiana as an example of how states might navigate the 
Sporhase Doctrine. 
A. State Characterization and Treatment of Water Resources 
1. Determining Whether Water Is an Article of Commerce 
The threshold question for whether state water restrictions are 
subject to Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry is whether the 
state’s water is an article of commerce.159 If so, then the water falls 
under federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction and restrictions must 
pass Dormant Commerce Clause muster.160 If not, then state water 
restrictions are immune from Dormant Commerce Clause 
review.161 Importantly and fortunately, the Sporhase Doctrine 
demonstrates that whether water is under federal Commerce 
Clause–Dormant Commerce Clause jurisdiction requires no 
inquiry into the historically confusing162 and continuingly 
contentious163 concept of navigability.164 The question centers 
solely on whether water is an article of commerce.165  
In turn, whether water is an article of commerce depends on 
how states treat water, both in law and in practice. In reviewing 
this issue, a court performs a three-step inquiry, with the third step 
likely to be most important. First, the court determines whether 
                                                                                                         
 159. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 943 (1982); 
see also Klein, supra note 62, at 137 (“Instead of considering whether the 
challenged Nebraska statute posed an impermissible burden on interstate 
commerce, Sporhase first evaluated whether groundwater itself is an article of 
commerce.”). 
 160. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See generally PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) 
(analyzing historic navigability). 
 163. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (determining 
that navigable waters within the purview of the Clean Water Act include waters 
that are relatively permanent and not simply intermittent or ephemeral). 
 164. The concern for navigability involved with Clean Water Act 
jurisdictional inquiries stems from the Clean Water Act’s use of the statutory 
term “navigable waters.” See id. at 723. Because no such statutory language 
governs the question of whether water is an article of commerce, the 
navigability issue is inapposite in this instance. 
 165. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954. 
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states have the power to characterize water such that it does not 
enter commerce. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has answered 
this question affirmatively and has not revisited it, this step 
becomes essentially a background principle.166 Second, the Court 
inquires whether the state has exercised this power and declared 
water to be outside of commerce. If state law treats water as an 
article of commerce, the inquiry is over and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause balancing can begin.167 If, however, state law 
declares water to be publicly owned or reserved outside of 
commerce, the court takes a third step and examines the practice 
within the state to see if the de facto treatment of water resembles 
commerce. As opposed to the first two inquiries, which tend 
toward formalism, this third, functionalist inquiry is fact-intensive 
and focuses on state practice rather than on written law. This third 
inquiry is also the ultimate determiner of whether water is an 
article of commerce. As such, one might approach the third inquiry 
as a shorthand, single-step determination of whether water is an 
article of commerce, but both a thorough, precise analysis of state 
authority and a complete synthesis of the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the issue involve all three steps.  
Regarding the first question, the court determines whether the 
states have the power to define property rights in natural resources, 
particularly water-use rights, in such a way that they do not enter 
interstate commerce. The U.S. Supreme Court answered this 
question affirmatively in Hudson County and has not since 
reexamined this fundamental question.168 In Hudson County, the 
Court recognized that states’ police power includes the authority to 
designate certain resources, especially water, as public things that 
cannot be held as private property and thus cannot be bought and 
sold.169 No case since has directly disputed or overruled this 
conclusion.170 Rather, in Altus, Texas merely declined to exercise 
this power and, instead, legally treated its groundwater as private 
                                                                                                         
 166. See Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1908). 
 167. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954. 
 168. Hudson Cnty., 209 U.S. at 356–57. 
 169. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 170. While Hudson County relied in part on Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 
519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), as 
precedent for expansive state authority in this area, and while Geer was 
subsequently overruled by Hughes, this case dealt with federal regulatory 
authority rather than with limiting states’ authority to define property in 
resources. Hudson Cnty., 209 U.S. at 356. Additionally, Hughes offers another 
example of state practice (the sale of minnows), reflecting that the state did not 
actually remove the item from commerce de facto. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 323. 
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property,171 and in Sporhase Nebraska’s groundwater was an 
article of commerce not because Nebraska lacked the authority to 
reserve it outside of commerce, but because Nebraska de facto 
treated its groundwater as a marketable item.172 Thus, the Supreme 
Court has continually recognized state authority to classify water 
as publicly owned and outside of commerce. So, the first question 
essentially becomes a background legal principle about the extent 
of state power, leaving for the second and third inquiries the 
question of whether states have actually, in law and in fact, 
exercised this power and treated water as a resource outside of 
commerce. 
This leads to the second inquiry, where a court examines 
whether state law classifies water resources as private property—
and thus articles of commerce—or as public resources outside of 
commerce. The Supreme Court in Hudson County went this far,173 
concluding that New Jersey’s riparian scheme maintained a public 
ownership of surface water and thus legally reserved it outside of 
commerce.174 The Altus decision175 also concluded at this second 
inquiry because Texas law treated groundwater as private property 
in commerce, so no further examination was necessary before 
beginning Dormant Commerce Clause review.176 Finally, in 
Sporhase the Court examined Nebraska’s legal treatment of its 
water, recognizing that Nebraska law and the Nebraska Supreme 
Court considered water not to be “a market item freely transferable 
for value among private parties, and therefore . . . not an article of 
commerce.”177 Thus, the Court in Sporhase moved to the 
                                                                                                         
 171. There was no written Supreme Court opinion in Altus, but in Sporhase 
the Court briefly discussed the interplay between Altus and Hudson County. 
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 950. The Court noted that Altus “is inconsistent with 
Hudson County” based on the district court’s analysis of the Texas statute at 
issue in Altus, which it found unconstitutional because it prevented water that 
was personal property, and, thus in commerce, from being transported interstate. 
Id. at 950 & n.12.  
 172. Id. at 951. In fact, Sporhase recognized that state ownership of 
resources is not “without significance” and “may not be irrelevant to Commerce 
Clause analysis”; it just moved to the second and third inquiries to resolve the 
issue. Id. at 951–53. 
 173. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). In Hudson County, the Court stopped its inquiry at 
this step because it had not yet developed the functionalist third inquiry used in 
Sporhase.  
 174. See supra notes 71–84 and accompanying text. 
 175. Though in Altus the Supreme Court did not necessarily adopt the 
reasoning of the lower court, the Court’s subsequent discussion of Altus in 
Sporhase shows that it fits within this analysis.  
 176. See supra notes 86–96 and accompanying text. 
 177. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 944. 
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functionalist third inquiry, asking how the state actually treats 
water de facto.  
In the third inquiry, the court moves from examining 
announced legal treatment of water to investigating state practice. 
Here, the court determines whether the state actually treats water 
as a public good outside of commerce or whether the assertions of 
public ownership merely mask commoditized water that is 
transferred for value.178 The bulk of the Court’s analysis in 
Sporhase centered on this third inquiry,179 and it ultimately found 
Nebraska’s claimed public ownership of water to be a “legal 
fiction” because it was inconsistent with the water marketing 
occurring within Nebraska.180 Looking past legalistic 
characterizations, the Court asked simply whether water was 
exchanged for value in Nebraska.181 The Court found that it was 
because Municipal Utility Districts in Nebraska distributed water 
in exchange for payment.182 Thus, the Court concluded that the 
exchange of payment for water made it a market commodity and 
article of commerce, regardless of the formal characterizations or 
rate structures.183  
                                                                                                         
 178. This is another example of water rights distinguishing between formal 
“paper rights” and functional realities at play. 
 179. When Hudson County was decided, the Court did not yet use this 
functionalist third inquiry. If it had, Hudson might have come out differently if 
water was distributed for a price within New Jersey, as was the plan for the 
water exported out of New Jersey. 
 180. Id. at 951–52. Sporhase proves that a court will give a hard look to 
whether water is an article of commerce based on state practice, not just state 
declaration. As much is clear in the Sporhase opinion where, despite the 
Nebraska Supreme Court’s declaration that Nebraska groundwater was not a 
market item, id. at 944, the Supreme Court looked beyond that to the Nebraska 
practice of allowing the transfer of some groundwater for a fee. See id. at 951 
(citing Nebraska’s permitting of arrangements transferring water from rural to 
urban areas). This differs greatly from the deference to New Jersey’s practice 
found in Hudson County. See, e.g., Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 
U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (“The problems of irrigation have no place here. Leaving 
them on one side, it appears to us that few public interests are more obvious, 
indisputable, and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public 
of a state to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially 
undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public 
welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.”). 
 181. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 951–52. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 951–52 (“The fiction is illustrated by municipal water supply 
arrangements pursuant to which ground water is withdrawn from rural areas and 
transferred to urban areas. Such arrangements are permitted in Nebraska, but the 
Nebraska Supreme Court distinguished them on the ground that the transferor 
was only permitted to charge as a price for the water his costs of distribution and 
not the value of the water itself. Unless demand is greater than supply, however, 
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The state-specific nature of these three inquiries illustrates that 
the Sporhase Doctrine contains no categorical conclusion that all 
water is necessarily an article of commerce. Rather, all of these 
cases look at the particularities of state law and practice to 
determine, on a state-by-state basis, whether water is an article of 
commerce in a given state.184 Further, while the functionalist third 
inquiry may ultimately reveal that water is an article of commerce 
in most, if not all, states, due regard for state sovereignty and 
police power in defining property requires the entire three-step 
inquiry for an informed look at state law and practice. Anything 
less than a thorough state-by-state approach would essentially strip 
states of their fundamental police-power authority to define (or 
redefine) property.185  
In this regard, El Paso I and II exhibited a common misreading 
of Sporhase and erred in failing to follow the three-step state-by-
state inquiry. These cases failed to recognize that state sovereignty 
includes the potential authority, whether exercised or not, to 
reserve water outside of commerce, failed to analyze whether state 
law purported to hold water outside of commerce, and failed to 
inquire whether New Mexico actually treated water as a 
commodity. Instead, El Paso I and II applied Sporhase’s “legal 
fiction” analysis as absolute and, in doing so, fostered 
                                                                                                         
 
this reasoning does not distinguish minnows, the price of which presumably is 
derived from the costs of seining and of transporting the catch to market. Even 
in cases of shortage, in which the seller of the natural resource can demand a 
price that exceeds his costs, the State’s rate structure that requires the price to be 
cost-justified is economically comparable to price regulation. A State’s power to 
regulate prices or rates has never been thought to depend on public ownership of 
the controlled commodity. It would be anomalous if federal power to regulate 
economic transactions in natural resources depended on the characterization of 
the payment as compensation for distribution services, on the one hand, or as the 
price of goods, on the other.” (citations omitted)). 
 184. The Sporhase opinion emphasizes the state-by-state nature of this 
inquiry, noting that “[i]f Congress chooses to legislate [to regulate groundwater] 
under its commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska 
than in Texas and States with similar property laws.” Id. at 953. The Court did 
not say that Congress will have equal Commerce Clause power to regulate water 
in all states; rather, the Court focused on states with property regimes that 
commoditize water: Nebraska, Texas, and “[s]tates with similar property laws.” 
Id. Thus, the Court emphasized that the proper inquiry for whether water is an 
article of commerce will turn on examination of the particular property law of 
each state. 
 185. For example, if a state declared water to be publicly owned and had no 
municipal utility arrangements transferring water for value, or if it eliminated 
such arrangements, its water could be considered outside of commerce. 
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misunderstanding and confusion about the proper application of 
Sporhase, as well as the extent of state police power.186 
While the Sporhase Doctrine is not categorical and involves 
state-by-state inquiries, most states have municipal utilities that 
distribute water for a fee,187 so they will likely find that their 
waters are articles of commerce. Thus, in designing or amending 
water restrictions, states with these utilities arrangements should 
assume that they will be subject to Dormant Commerce Clause 
review. As discussed above, if water is exchanged for value, it will 
be an article of commerce.188 However, this functional inquiry 
draws no apparent distinction between groundwater versus surface 
water. So, even though Sporhase addressed only groundwater and 
most state laws distinguish between ground and surface water,189 
attempts to distinguish Sporhase on this basis are likely to fail in 
the presence of a fee-based water utility. Similarly, while it may be 
tempting for eastern states to argue that Sporhase is the rule for 
prior appropriation jurisdictions whereas Hudson County governs 
riparian schemes, that distinction also fades in light of the 
importance that Sporhase placed on water utilities.190  
In Louisiana, for example, water is an article of commerce 
under the functionalist third inquiry even though that state follows 
a riparian approach,191 distinguishes between surface and 
groundwater, and has a strong legal tradition characterizing water 
                                                                                                         
 186. In the end, the El Paso cases may have reached the correct conclusion 
about New Mexico water being an article of commerce because water is 
municipally supplied in that state. However, this does not ameliorate application 
of the incorrect test and reasoning.  
 187. See generally Scott E. Masten, Public Utility Ownership in 19th-
Century America: The “Aberrant” Case of Water, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 604 
(2011). 
 188. See supra notes 181–183 and accompanying text. 
 189. See, e.g., Sharon Megdal et al., The Forgotten Sector: Arizona Water 
Law and the Environment, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 243, 276 (2011) 
(“Arizona law regulates groundwater and surface water differently.”); Travis 
Witherspoon, Into the Well: Desired Future Conditions and the Emergence of 
Groundwater as the New Senior Water Right, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 
166, 169 (2010) (explaining that in Texas, “[g]roundwater is not state owned 
and controlled like surface water” and describing the laws governing each); see 
also Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Public Trust: Application of the Public Trust 
Doctrine to Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 204 (2008) 
(“Though groundwater aquifers know no political bounds and are often 
interconnected to surface waters, groundwater law traditionally was adopted on 
a state-by-state basis separate from laws governing surface water.”). 
 190. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951–52 (1982). 
 191. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 657 (2008) (“The owner of an estate bordering 
on running water may use it as it runs for the purpose of watering his estate or 
for other purposes.”). 
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as publicly owned. Working through the three-pronged Sporhase 
inquiry, first, Louisiana, like all states, has the police power 
authority to define property as falling outside of commerce. 
Second, Louisiana law appears to exercise this authority, at least 
when it comes to surface water. The Louisiana Constitution 
recognizes public responsibilities in water192 and prevents 
alienation of state-owned, water-related resources.193 Additionally, 
Louisiana law declares surface waters to be public things,194 even 
limiting riparian uses of surface water,195 though it has recently 
loosened these limitations.196 However, with respect to the third 
factor, Louisiana treats groundwater as private property,197 so a 
court is likely to find that Louisiana has not legally withdrawn 
groundwater from commerce. Regardless, because Louisiana 
municipal utilities distribute both surface water198 and 
groundwater199 for a fee, the public ownership characterization, 
even for surface water, is a legal fiction in this case. Thus, 
                                                                                                         
 192. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including 
air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the 
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and 
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall 
enact laws to implement this policy.”). The Louisiana Supreme Court has read 
article IX, section 1 to impose a “public trust” duty of environmental protection on 
all state agencies and officials. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control 
Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1156 (La. 1984). 
 193. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14 (prohibiting donations of state property); 
Id. art. IX, § 3 (prohibiting alienation of the beds of navigable waters except for 
reclamation of eroded lands). 
 194. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (2010) (declaring such things as 
running waters, waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the 
territorial sea, and the seashore to be public things); see also LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:1101 (2008) (declaring the water and beds of bayous, rivers, lakes, 
streams, lagoons, lakes, and bays not privately owned on August 12, 1910, to be 
owned by the State). 
 195. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 657, 658 (2008). 
 196. See Act of May 25, 2012, No. 261, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 261 (H.B. 
532) (West) (allowing the State of Louisiana to enter into cooperative endeavor 
agreements for use of running surface waters for nonriparian and consumptive 
use). 
 197. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490 (2010); see also Adams v. Grigsby, 
152 So. 2d 619, 622 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (treating groundwater as a fugitive 
resource subject to the laws of capture and placing restrictions on location or 
purpose of use). 
 198. See The Water Purification Process at the Carrollton Plant, SEWERAGE 
& WATER BD. OF NEW ORLEANS, http://www.swbno.org/history_water_ 
purification.asp (last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (describing the Mississippi River as 
the water source for New Orleans, Louisiana utilities). 
 199. See City of Ruston: Water Utilities, RUSTON.ORG, http://www.ruston. 
org/waterfaq/#q3783 (last visited Aug. 9, 2012) (describing the Sparta Aquifer 
as the source of municipal water for the city of Ruston, Louisiana). 
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Louisiana water is an article of commerce under the third inquiry 
because, functionally, Louisiana has water provision arrangements 
similar to those at issue in Sporhase. 
As the Louisiana example demonstrates, while states retain the 
power to characterize water resources and public ownership of 
water is not necessarily always a legal fiction, the functionalist 
third inquiry in the Sporhase test means that the water in most 
states, including most riparian jurisdictions, will be considered an 
article of commerce. Thus, states should shape water restrictions 
with a mind toward Dormant Commerce Clause review. 
2. The Importance of State Characterization in Dormant 
Commerce Clause Balancing 
While, as a practical matter, most states’ water will be an 
article of commerce, state characterization of water resources is far 
from irrelevant. Even when a state’s asserted ownership of its 
water resources is a legal fiction insufficient to avoid Dormant 
Commerce Clause review, it can still impact the Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis and trigger greater deference from 
courts. As the Court observed in Sporhase, “Nor is appellee’s 
claim to public ownership without significance. Like Congress’ 
deference to state water law, these factors inform the determination 
whether the burdens on commerce imposed by state ground water 
regulation are reasonable or unreasonable.”200 Even when water is 
an article of commerce, the state’s treatment and characterization 
of its water resources remain relevant. Thus, returning again to the 
example of Louisiana, while the strong declarations of public 
ownership201 of water will not immunize Louisiana water 
restrictions from Dormant Commerce Clause review, they will 
likely give Louisiana more latitude in shaping water regulations 
because they make such regulations more likely to be reasonable. 
B. Generally Applicable Water Restrictions 
The second major consideration under Sporhase is whether a 
water restriction is generally applicable because the scope of a 
water restriction greatly impacts its likelihood of surviving a 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. As noted, courts evaluate 
“evenhanded” restrictions with the Pike test, balancing the burden 
imposed on commerce against the benefits to the regulating 
                                                                                                         
 200. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982). 
 201. See supra notes 192–196 and accompanying text. 
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state.202 In the water context, this amounts to a review for 
reasonableness, with the Court offering deference to states’ 
expertise in managing water resources.203 Alternatively, 
restrictions that are not considered evenhanded face a low 
likelihood of surviving a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. 
Such restrictions, dubbed “explicit barrier[s] to commerce,” 
receive strict scrutiny analysis, requiring that the restriction be 
narrowly tailored to the state’s legitimate interest.204 While not 
impossible to survive,205 this standard of review usually leads to 
invalidation of a restriction. 
Because the evenhanded versus explicit-barrier-to-commerce 
distinction is so crucial to determining the constitutionality of a 
regulation, the differences between the two are critical, though not 
necessarily intuitive. For example, to qualify as an evenhanded 
regulation, a water restriction need not actually treat interstate and 
intrastate transfers of water the same way. Rather, an evenhanded 
regulation can burden interstate transfers differently than intrastate 
transfers so long as the regulation also restricts intrastate 
transfers. Thus, the requirement for evenhandedness is not one of 
uniformity; rather, it is one of comparability. For example, in 
Sporhase the Court found Nebraska’s requirements “that the 
withdrawal of the ground water requested is reasonable, is not 
contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not 
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare” to be an evenhanded 
and ultimately constitutional restriction because Nebraska also 
imposed restrictions on intrastate transfers.206 The fact that the 
interstate restrictions were not the same as those on intrastate 
transfers did not concern the Court. In fact, the Court offered no 
discussion of the relative stringency or restrictiveness of the 
intrastate versus interstate restrictions. Rather, in determining that 
the restrictions were evenhanded, the Court focused on the fact that 
there were corollary, though not identical, intrastate regulations.207  
The Court went so far as to say that a regulation could apply 
only to out-of-state transfers and still qualify as evenhanded and 
                                                                                                         
 202. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954–57. 
 204. See id. at 957–58. 
 205. For an example of surviving strict scrutiny in the Dormant Commerce 
Clause context, see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a Maine 
statute banning import of live baitfish after subjecting the statute to strict 
scrutiny because Maine documented that there was no less discriminatory means 
of avoiding the import of parasites harmful to wild fish). 
 206. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955–56. 
 207. Id. 
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constitutional, again showing that evenhanded does not mean 
uniform. For example, in Sporhase the Court noted that  
[a]lthough Commerce Clause concerns are implicated by 
the fact that [Nebraska’s water restriction] applies to 
interstate transfers but not to intrastate transfers, there are 
legitimate reasons for the special treatment accorded 
requests to transport ground water across state lines. 
Obviously, a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use 
restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against 
interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the 
uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State.208  
Thus, the mere existence of other, separate intrastate restrictions 
satisfied the Court that the interstate restrictions were evenhanded. 
Essentially, this means that courts will require states to have their 
own resource restrictions in order before imposing restrictions on 
other states. Put another way, a state’s entire water restriction or 
conservation program cannot focus solely on restricting interstate 
use or transport; it must restrict its own citizens as well, at least to 
some degree. 
As for “explicit barriers” to interstate commerce, the Court did 
not offer a list or test to identify this suspect category of 
restrictions. However, the Court indicated that the following will 
constitute explicit barriers: a complete ban on export of water, a 
condition making export of water practically impossible,209 a 
restriction without an intrastate corollary, a regulation with 
discriminatory effect and purpose, and a regulation effecting pure 
economic protectionism.210 
Because evenhanded restrictions have a much greater 
likelihood of surviving a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, 
states should strive to ensure that their restrictions are evenhanded. 
The easiest way to achieve evenhandedness is by ensuring that any 
interstate restrictions have intrastate corollaries, even if they are 
not completely uniform. Though the Court has indicated that 
regulations can be evenhanded even when intrastate restrictions do 
                                                                                                         
 208. Id.  
 209. This was the situation in Sporhase. The Nebraska law contained a 
reciprocity requirement that allowed export of water to only those states that 
would also export water to Nebraska. Id. at 957–58. This requirement made it 
impossible to export water from Nebraska to Colorado because Colorado banned 
all export of water. Id. Ironically, then, it was Colorado’s hardline restriction 
that led to the invalidation of Nebraska’s lesser restriction as an explicit barrier 
to commerce. 
 210. Id. at 956–58. 
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not exactly match interstate restrictions,211 there is little precedent 
to guide how disparate the treatment can be while still remaining 
evenhanded. The closer the match between interstate and intrastate 
restrictions, the more likely a restriction will be evenhanded, so 
states should err on the side of treating interstate and intrastate uses 
equally.  
Fortunately for many states, water restrictions that are rooted in 
traditional water regimes (such as riparianism) or tied to factors 
other than state lines are evenhanded because they apply also to 
intrastate use. So, for example, traditional riparian principles that 
restrict the use of water to riparian tracts or to a reasonable 
distance from a stream are evenhanded because they affect both in-
state and out-of-state use equally. Similarly, prior appropriation 
doctrines like the “no harm” doctrine, which disallows water 
transfers that injure junior appropriators,212 are evenhanded, as are 
watershed-based or basin-based transfer restrictions and in-stream 
flow requirements for ecology or navigation. All of these 
restrictions apply to both intrastate and interstate uses and can 
supply a starting point for states seeking to restrict water use. 
Returning to the example of Louisiana, the state’s traditional 
riparian restrictions requiring that surface water be used on a 
riparian estate and be returned to its original channel213 are 
certainly evenhanded restrictions. However, the state’s recent law 
relaxing these restrictions and allowing the state to enter into 
cooperative endeavor agreements for consumptive use of surface 
water or use on nonriparian tracts214 withdraws the evenhanded 
place-based limitations on surface water use. If Louisiana were to 
try to introduce additional limitations on the use of surface water, it 
must be careful not to restrict out-of-state users without imposing 
some in-state restrictions. Similarly, Louisiana’s groundwater use 
is not currently restricted in terms of place or purpose of use,215 so 
                                                                                                         
 211. Id. at 955–56 (explaining that “a State that imposes severe withdrawal 
and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate 
commerce” and applying this principle because the first three standards at issue 
“may” have been less strict in application than the limitations placed on 
intrastate transfers). 
 212. See Johanna Hamburger, Improving Efficiency and Overcoming 
Obstacles to Water Transfers in Utah, 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 69, 78 
(2011) (explaining that the no harm rule, “a doctrine that all Western states 
follow,” disallows a change of use of water from impairing vested rights). 
 213. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 657, 658 (2008). 
 214. See Act of May 25, 2012, No. 261, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 261 (H.B. 
532) (West). 
 215. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490 (2010); see also Adams v. Grigsby, 
152 So. 2d 619, 623−24 (La. Ct. App. 1963). 
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any restriction placed on out-of-state groundwater use would likely 
be an explicit barrier to commerce without an in-state corollary. 
C. Documentation of Water Shortages 
Another major consideration arising from Sporhase is the 
importance of state documentation of water “shortages” to justify 
water restrictions. A documented record of water shortage makes a 
state’s water restrictions more likely to survive a Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge because such a record builds the case 
that water restrictions are valid health and safety regulations, as 
opposed to impermissible economic protectionism. This Section 
discusses the evolution of this documentation requirement and 
considers what evidence of “shortage” will help in surviving 
Dormant Commerce Clause review of water restrictions, 
particularly for wetter eastern states.  
Just as Sporhase expanded the Hudson County inquiry into 
whether water was an article of commerce by investigating how 
states actually treat water in addition to how they legally classify 
it,216 Sporhase also deepened the Hudson inquiry into the purpose 
of state water restrictions, examining documentation of shortage to 
justify state regulations. In Hudson County, the Court explicitly 
declined to inquire into evidence of shortage as a basis for state 
water restrictions; rather, the Court held that New Jersey’s police 
power provided sufficient authority for its water restrictions and 
that a state need not offer explanation for its resource management 
decisions.217 However, in Sporhase, the Court showed no such 
deference to unexplained state management decisions218 and 
instead required states to articulate reasoning to justify their water 
                                                                                                         
 216. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text. 
 217. See Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1908). 
In fact, the Court emphatically stated that the states need offer no justification. 
Id. (“We are of opinion, further, that the constitutional power of the state to 
insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not 
dependent upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as 
to future needs. . . . [A state] finds itself in possession of what all admit to be a 
great public good, and what it has it may keep and give no one a reason for its 
will.” (emphasis added)). 
 218. It is possible that the different inquiries in the two cases explain the 
difference. In Hudson, the Court found that the Dormant Commerce Clause 
inquiry was inapplicable because the water was not an article of commerce. Id. 
In Sporhase, however, the water was an article of commerce, and the Court 
required documentation so that it could evaluate the Dormant Commerce Clause 
issue. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953–54 (1982). 
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restrictions,219 stressing the importance of documenting shortage 
and of closely examining the evidence proffered to justify 
Nebraska’s restrictions.220  
For example, in upholding Nebraska’s evenhanded restrictions, 
the Court in Sporhase emphasized the evidence of shortage 
necessitating those restrictions. The Court noted its reluctance “to 
condemn as unreasonable, measures taken by a State to conserve 
and preserve for its own citizens this vital resource in times of 
severe shortage.”221 The Court also identified as evidence of 
shortage Nebraska’s designation of groundwater control areas, its 
declarations of water shortage, and its restrictions and monitoring 
of in-state water use and transfers.222 In light of this documented 
need, the Court had little trouble finding Nebraska’s evenhanded 
restrictions reasonable.223 
Conversely, in holding that Nebraska’s reciprocity requirement 
was not narrowly tailored, the Court emphasized a lack of 
documentation to justify that measure. Specifically, the Court 
highlighted a lack of evidence that  
the State as a whole suffers a water shortage, . . . the 
intrastate transportation of water from areas of abundance 
to areas of shortage is feasible regardless of distance, . . . 
                                                                                                         
 219. Id. at 954–55. This shift in the Court’s expectation of documentation is 
not unique to reviewing state actions, though. Rather, it fits with the Court’s 
requirements of Congress in exercise of its Commerce Clause power. For 
example, the record-keeping requirement in Sporhase provides a corollary to the 
requirements the Court placed on Congress in Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000). Those cases collectively stand for the proposition that when 
Congress wishes to push the limits of its Commerce Clause authority and 
regulate in areas that may infringe on state police power, Congress must make a 
clear statement of its intention to do so and must create a record documenting 
the links to interstate commerce that justify the federal authority to act in the 
area. The documentation requirement in Sporhase is the converse of the same 
concept. See generally Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce 
Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 23–29 (2003) (charting the history of the 
Commerce Clause and discussing Lopez, Morrison, and Solid Waste Agency in 
detail). Under Sporhase, when states wish to push the limits of their police 
power and regulate in areas that may infringe on Congress’s authority to 
regulate interstate commerce, then states must clearly document the justification 
for doing so. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954–55. According to the Court, when state 
or federal entities wish to push the limits of their regulatory authority, they must 
explain their basis for doing so. 
 220. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957–58. 
 221. Id. at 956 (emphasis added). 
 222. Id. at 955. 
 223. Id. at 955−56. 
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[or] the importation of water from adjoining States would 
roughly compensate for any exportation to those States.224  
With a record to justify the reciprocity requirement, the Court 
held that the restriction was not narrowly tailored.225 However, the 
Court indicated that had there been proper documentation, even 
Nebraska’s explicit barrier to commerce might have survived strict 
scrutiny because a “demonstrably arid” state may be able to 
marshal evidence that a total ban on exports is narrowly tailored.226   
The Court’s emphasis on “severe shortage” and “demonstrably 
arid” states raises the question of what constitutes sufficient 
shortage or aridity to influence the Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis. While there is little precedent, Sporhase and its 
subsequent interpretations in El Paso I and II indicate that 
economic concerns will be insufficient to demonstrate meaningful 
shortage.227 Rather, relevant shortage must trigger health, safety, 
environmental, recreational, or aesthetic concerns.228 Further, 
while states need not wait for imminent threats to human survival 
before restricting water use, the more concretely a state can link 
restrictions to human necessity, the more likely it is to survive 
Dormant Commerce Clause review. For example, the Court in 
Sporhase held that a state legitimately restricts water when 
“protecting the health of its citizens—and not simply the health of 
its economy.”229 El Paso I took this concept to its extreme, 
allowing that “a state may discriminate in favor of its citizens only 
to the extent that water is essential to human survival.”230 
However, the El Paso II court subsequently recognized that as long 
as economic concerns were not the primary motivating factor, a 
state could invoke a limited preference for public welfare concerns 
affecting health, safety, recreational, aesthetic, and environmental 
interests.231  
Moreover, states should also expect probing, substantive 
review of justifications given for water restrictions. Courts require 
more than a procedural cataloging of reasons; they closely examine 
the rationale for restrictions.232 For example, in El Paso II the court 
closely examined the justifications for a moratorium on 
                                                                                                         
 224. Id. at 958. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See supra notes 123–148 and accompanying text. 
 228. El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984). 
 229. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956. 
 230. El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. 379, 389 (D.N.M. 1983) (emphasis added). 
 231. El Paso II, 597 F. Supp. at 700. 
 232. Id. at 705 (“It is the duty of the court to look behind the legislative 
recitals of purpose to discover the true purpose of a challenged statute.”). 
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appropriations from two basins, ultimately finding them illusory 
and striking down the moratorium.233 In one instance of this close 
review, the court dismissed the asserted deficiency of hydrological 
information about the basins because the same was true of other 
basins not subject to moratoria and because a proposed study of the 
basins would not be complete until after the moratorium expired.234 
This hard look at the underlying documentation and reasoning for 
the moratorium shows that a court will probe into the substance of 
documentation, even for evenhanded regulations.  
Beyond the basic principles that purely economic concerns will 
not constitute acceptable shortage and that the court will take a 
hard look at evidence of shortage, questions still abound as to the 
circumstances that will demonstrate sufficient shortage to impact 
Dormant Commerce Clause balancing. For example, what must the 
timescale be for the shortage, and how bad must things get before 
restrictions are justified? Additionally, relatively water-rich states 
may wonder against which baseline courts will measure shortage; 
will a wet state ever be able to demonstrate shortage sufficient to 
satisfy the court? 
El Paso II noted these important questions but offered little 
concrete guidance beyond indicating that the inquiry will require 
balancing of specific circumstances. The court indicated that a 
state must offer a sense of the time, place, certainty, and severity of 
projected shortages, but it need not await disaster or drought before 
restricting water use.235 In the end, this will involve a balancing 
                                                                                                         
 233. Id. at 705–07. 
 234. Id. at 705–06. 
 235. Id. at 701. The court observed that 
[a] state may favor its own citizens in times and places of shortage. Of 
course, this does not mean that a state may limit or bar exports simply 
because it anticipates that one day there will not be enough water to 
meet all future uses. Even some of the most water-abundant states 
predict shortages at some future date. The preference envisioned by the 
Supreme Court must be limited to the times and places where its 
exercise would not place unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce 
relative to the local benefits it produces. 
   On the other hand, it would be unreasonable to require a state to wait 
until it is in the midst of a dire shortage before it can prefer its own 
citizens’ use of the available water over out-of-state usage. A limited 
preference which could not be exercised until water resources were 
almost depleted would be no preference at all. If the limited preference 
is to be meaningful the states must be permitted to prefer local usage 
while there is still water to conserve. The proximity in time of a 
projected shortage, the certainty that it will occur, its predicted severity, 
and whether alternative measures could prevent or alleviate the 
shortage are all factors which must be weighed when balancing the 
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inquiry, but the more information that a state can marshal to justify 
its position and show the need for water restrictions, the more 
likely the restrictions are to survive Dormant Commerce Clause 
review. 
As for “wet” states documenting shortage, they cannot be 
categorically excluded from enacting water restrictions simply 
because of their relative abundance of water. With water demand 
growing and climate change threatening to decrease supplies 
throughout the country, shortage is not just an issue in the drier 
West. Further, “wet” states have environmental and ecological 
water demands based on relative abundance of water. Thus, while 
a drought year in Louisiana might still see more water than a wet 
year in Arizona,236 this does not diminish the problems 
(environmental and otherwise) that shortage poses in the wetter 
state. The court’s inquiry into shortage must proceed state-by-state 
and consider the broader context in evaluating water restrictions. In 
these instances, “shortage” or “arid[ity]” must function more as a 
term of art, synonymous with “demonstrated water need.” The 
cases show that it is the responsibility of the individual states to 
document these water shortages and to educate the court on these 
water needs, and this is particularly important in wetter states 
where needs may not be as obvious. Additionally, because of 
historically and relatively more abundant water supplies, wetter 
states may face greater challenges in demonstrating that their 
restrictions are not protectionist, so documentation of shortage 
must focus particularly on health and safety concerns.  
States may draw upon a number of sources to demonstrate such 
shortage. Documentation of a drought or historical scarcity is the 
                                                                                                         
 
local interests served by the exercise of a preference against the 
burdens it places on interstate commerce. 
   New Mexico need not wait until the appropriate time and place of 
shortage arises to enact a statute limiting exports. The State may enact a 
law to provide for future contingencies. If facially valid, any 
constitutional attack on such a statute for violation of the Commerce 
Clause must await its application.  
Id. 
 236. The year 1988 is often used as benchmark year for low flows on the 
Mississippi River, a year in which flows at Vicksburg, Mississippi were 439,000 
cubic feet per second, which compares to the record-high flows on the Colorado 
of 35,222 cubic feet per second (25.5 million acre feet per year). See U.S. DEP’T 
OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, INTERIM REPORT NO. 1: COLORADO 
RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY (STATUS REPORT) 18 (2011); 
Edwin P. Maurer & Dennis P. Lettenmaier, Calculation of Undepleted Runoff 
for the GCIP Region, 1988–2000, UNIV. OF WASH. (Oct. 2001),  
http://www.ce.washington.edu/~edm/WEBS_runoff/.  
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obvious approach. Documentation of increased consumption levels 
or projections of water supply may also suffice when tied to human 
health rather than economic uses. Even preexisting regulation of 
intrastate water resources helps demonstrate scarcity, as the 
Supreme Court recognized in Sporhase.237 Beyond these sources, 
states may also attempt to rely on projections of climate change 
destabilizing water supplies, documented environmental water 
needs such as ecosystem demands on freshwater, and even 
hydrological or geophysical characteristics of particular water 
sources such as recharge rates for particular aquifers. The ultimate 
guiding principle is that a record of shortage must be focused on 
health and safety rather than economic concerns and must be 
sufficiently concrete. 
Louisiana can again serve as the example for approaches and 
challenges that wetter eastern states face in documenting shortage. 
To its benefit, Louisiana has, to some extent, documented its 
coastal freshwater needs. For example, the 2012 Louisiana Coastal 
Master Plan demonstrates the need for ample freshwater flows to 
nourish and sustain Louisiana’s coastal environment.238 This is a 
start, and to build on it, Louisiana might attempt to quantify coastal 
freshwater needs along with the water needs of upland wetlands. In 
most other regards, however, Louisiana has not sufficiently 
documented water needs to positively influence a Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis. In the case of groundwater, Louisiana 
has neither inventoried its supply nor imposed any restriction on 
groundwater use. For surface water, Louisiana fares little better. 
Again, Louisiana has no comprehensive surface water inventory, 
budget, or management plan. Although Louisiana’s riparian system 
imposes some limitations on water use and requires return flows 
back into the watercourse, Louisiana has statutorily relaxed them 
in order to facilitate development. Essentially, Louisiana currently 
treats its water as if there is no shortage or need to conserve, and 
this free-spending attitude toward in-state water use will severely 
disadvantage any attempt to restrict out-of-state use. In requiring 
that states document water shortages to justify restrictions, the 
Supreme Court requires states to have their in-state management in 
order before burdening other states. States must form a record to 
                                                                                                         
 237. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 941, 957 
(1982) (holding that state conservation efforts are not without import because 
they show that “the natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly 
produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times of 
shortage”). 
 238. See 2012 LOUISIANA COASTAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 9.  
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educate courts on particular water needs that justify regulations, as 
well as on state efforts to share the burden of water restriction.  
D. Water Compact Language 
Though Sporhase represents the heart of the Court’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause inquiry for water restrictions, also important is 
when Sporhase does not apply. This is the case when waters are 
subject to an interstate compact.239 Water compacts can insulate 
restrictions from Dormant Commerce Clause challenges because 
Congress must approve a compact.240 Thus, water restrictions 
pursuant to compacts effectively bear Congress’s blessing and 
therefore cannot interfere with federal regulation of interstate 
commerce. When a water restriction involves compact waters, the 
initial inquiry turns to whether the compact authorizes the 
restriction through clear delegation of authority to the states. If 
there has been such delegation, then the restriction is immune from 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge; if not, then the restriction 
receives Dormant Commerce Clause review under Sporhase. Thus, 
prior to conducting its Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, El 
Paso I extensively analyzed a potentially relevant water compact 
to ensure that it did not remove the issue from Dormant Commerce 
Clause concern.241 
Because so much turns on whether the compact clearly 
delegates to states the authority to regulate waters as commerce, 
the particulars of compact language take on vital importance. 
Courts have found such delegation when compact language divides 
water between states. In such instances, Congress has essentially 
allocated water to the states, and states can restrict that water 
without worrying about interfering with interstate commerce.  
In Tarrant, for example, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the 
Red River Compact contained a sufficiently clear congressional 
grant of authority to allow Oklahoma to regulate certain Red River 
                                                                                                         
 239. The Interstate Compact Clause of the United States Constitution provides, 
in relevant part, that no state may, “without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another State.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 240. See Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The 
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. 
J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 90 (2011) (“Since the federal government can 
discriminate against particular states through federal legislation, an interstate 
compact as federal law is immunized against dormant Commerce Clause 
violations.”). 
 241. See El Paso I, 563 F. Supp. 379, 383–88 (D.N.M. 1983). 
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water without regard to the Dormant Commerce Clause.242 
Particularly, the court focused on the compact provisions that 
allowed states to “freely administer” water apportioned to them “in 
any manner” that seemed beneficial.243 The court also noted that 
the compact explicitly stated that it was not meant to “interfere” 
with state “appropriation, use, and control of water” and that the 
state retained “unrestricted use” of waters in basins covered by the 
compact.244 The Tenth Circuit concluded that “[t]aken together, the 
Compact provisions using words and phrases such as ‘unrestricted 
use,’ ‘control,’ ‘in any manner,’ ‘freely administer,’ and ‘nothing 
shall be deemed to interfere’ give the Oklahoma Legislature wide 
latitude to regulate interstate commerce in its state’s apportioned 
water.”245 As a result, the court decided that Oklahoma’s 
restrictions were immune from the Sporhase Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis.246 
Thus, states can find more flexibility by shaping water 
restrictions pursuant to compact terms because such restrictions 
would be immune to Dormant Commerce Clause review. So, for 
example, since Louisiana is a party to the Red River Compact,247 it 
could restrict water subject to that compact without worry of 
Dormant Commerce Clause invalidation, even if the restrictions 
were not evenhanded or were lacking justification in water 
shortage.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Water may be an article of commerce, but it is also a resource 
that must, at least to some extent, remain in its natural place. 
Otherwise, environments, ecosystems, and even entire coastal 
landmasses unravel. Thus, there is a vital state interest in keeping 
water where it naturally occurs. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
does not run counter to such critical health and safety interests; it 
merely seeks to ferret out economic protectionism. Therefore, the 
Sporhase Doctrine does and must allow states to regulate water in 
favor of keeping it in its natural place, even if this means keeping 
wet states wet. To conclude otherwise would turn Sporhase on its 
head by allowing the economic wants of dry, importing states to 
trump the environmental needs for water in wetter origin states. It 
                                                                                                         
 242. See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th 
Cir. 2011). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 1237−38. 
 245. Id. at 1239. 
 246. Id.  
 247. See Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980). 
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would allow importing states to practice just the sort of economic 
protectionism that the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits. 
A correct reading of Sporhase shows that it does not create a 
great shift in control of water resources. The states, through law 
and practice, still determine whether water is an article in 
commerce. When water restrictions are subject to Dormant 
Commerce Clause review, they are likely to survive if evenhanded 
and justified by documentation of shortage. Thus, states retain 
substantial control over their water resources and, following the 
proper guidance from Sporhase, may act to protect them without 
running afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.  
Not only does Sporhase preserve states’ abilities to maintain 
water in place, but it also encourages better water practices within 
states by decoupling federal jurisdiction over water from the 
clumsy question of navigability, by discarding the prevalent but 
hydrologically dubious tendency to treat groundwater and surface 
water as distinct resources, and by forcing states to better study, 
document, and manage their water supplies.  
 
 
